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Abstract
A method is proposed for constructing from interactive protocols
digital signature schemes secure against adaptively chosen message
attacks Our main result is that practical secure signature schemes
can now also be based on computationally dicult problems other
than factoring see 	 such as the discrete logarithm problem
More precisely	 given only an interactive protocol of a certain type
as a primitive	 we can build a non
interactive signature scheme that
is secure in the strongest sense of Goldwasser	 Micali and Rivest
see  not existentially forgeable under adaptively chosen mes

sage attacks There are numerous examples of primitives that satisfy





McCurley 	 	 	 	 
In fact	 the existence of one
way group homomorphisms is a su

cient assumption to support our construction As we also demonstrate
that our construction can be based on claw
free pairs of trapdoor one

way permutations	 our results can be viewed as a generalization of





This paper deals with the construction of secure signature schemes By
secure we mean that some welldened computational assumption can be
shown to be sucient for the scheme not to be existentially forgeable even
under an adaptive chosen message attack This notion of optimal security
was introduced in 	
 Most if not all signature schemes used in practice
such as ISO		RSA or DSA are based on a computational assumption that
is certainly necessary for this kind of security but not known to be sucient
Goldwasser Micali and Rivest 	
 were the rst to nd a provably secure
signature scheme based on the existence of clawfree pairs of trapdoor one
way permutations Merkle   
 showed essentially that existence of collision
intractable hash functions is a sucient assumption Naor and Yung showed
that any oneway permutation is also enough  
 and nally this was reduced
to any oneway function which is also a necessary assumption by Rompel
 

Although secure signature schemes are generally less ecient than the
ones used in practice the eciency of the GMR scheme is not too bad when
based on factoring and by relying on the perhaps stronger assumption that
RSA is hard to invert Bos and Chaum 
 have been able to build an even
more ecient secure scheme
Recently Dwork and Naor 
 have exhibited an ecient and secure sig
nature scheme whose security is also equivalent to the diculty of RSA
inversion In contrast with other schemes that use authentication trees such
as 	
 they are able to reuse the authenticating nodes many times As a
result of this and further exploitations of the specic properties of the RSA
functions the length of their signatures can be made quite small although
a price has to be paid in the form of a large public le




 have come at the price of dramatically reduced eciency
In particular signatures have become larger Where a GMR signature is
of length Ok bits where k is the security parameter ignoring here any
dependency on the number of messages signed a NaorYung signature would
typically be of length Ok  bits because a full preimage under a oneway
function is required to authenticate   bit
Thus it has been an open question whether secure signatures with e
ciency comparable to or better than that of GMR could be based on more

general assumptions than clawfree pairs of trapdoor oneway permutations
In this paper we show that secure signature schemes with signatures as
short as those of GMR can be built if so called signature protocols exist In
particular our schemes have the same property as GMR that the length of
signatures grow logarithmically with the number of messages signed Note
that Goldreich 
 has shown that the GMR scheme can be modied so that
all signatures have length Ok log k bits This same modication applies to
our scheme as well
Dropping some technical details a signature protocol is an interactive
protocol for a hard problem that uses three messages where the prover speaks
rst and the verier sends a random challenge as the second message The
essential properties are
  The protocol must be secure zeroknowledge against the honest veri
er
  The challenge must be longer than the provers rst message
  It must be infeasible for a cheating prover to answer more than one
challenge in a given protocol execution
We show that it is sucient for the existence of signature protocols that
oneway group homomorphisms exist This has a nice theoretical conse
quence because it shows that compared to GMR the trapdoor property
can be traded for the homomorphism property without getting longer signa
tures Moreover our construction allows us in both signature generation and
verication to minimize the number of evaluations of the oneway function
and replace them by evaluations of the group operation in the the groups
involved This means that we can use the discrete logarithm assumption as
a basis for secure signatures in a much more ecient way than known be
fore Where earlier methods would with security parameter k require Ok 
exponentiations per basic authentication step and give signatures of length
Ok  bits our method requires O  exponentiations and gives signatures
of length Ok
We also show that existence of a three pass public coin proof of knowl
edge for any hard problem  and a collision intractable hash function implies
existence of signature protocols Although the hash function alone would be
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Figure   Protocol P common input x private input for P is w
enough to construct secure signatures using our method may lead to shorter
signatures Ok compared to Ok  depending on the protocol used
 Signature Protocols
This section is devoted to dening the basic building block a signature pro
tocol that is used in our construction for secure signatures
Let P be a three round public coin protocol where the prover speaks rst
Figure   depicts the kind of protocol we will look at It resembles a proof of
knowlege for a binary relation R see for instance 
 for details in that the
prover can always make the verier accept on common input x if the prover
knows w such that xw  R
Indeed by running probabilistic polynomial time algorithm Pa on x
and his secret witness w the prover P computes his initial message a and
some secret auxiliary information auxa The length of this rst message
a is denoted AP the authentication length which only depends on x After
having received a the verier V chooses a challenge c uniformly at random
and sends it to P  The length of admissible challenges in P is called the
challenge length CP we will sometimes abuse this notation to refer to the set
of possible challenges Also here it is assumed to depend only on x The
prover P completes the conversation by running probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm Pr on x w a c and the auxiliary information auxa for

a The resulting response r is submitted to the verier V  We will assume
that the procedure  that the verier V invokes to test the validity of the
conversation is a polynomial time algorithm The collection of all possible
accepting conversations with respect to x will be denoted Accx For the
rest of this paper P will denote a protocol as described above
For the purpose of constructing secure signature schemes the protocol P
does not however have to satisfy the ordinary soundness condition Instead
we require the following
Denition  Let k be a security parameter for protocol P Suppose we are
given a probabilistic polynomial time generator G for relation R that on input
 k produces xw  R such that no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm
given x as input can generate two accepting conversations with respect to x
a c r a c r from Accx with c  c except with negligible probability
of success Then P is called collision intractible over G
Next we need the protocol P to be secure in the following sense Instead
of requiring the protocol to be zeroknowledge against an arbitrary verier
we only demand that conversations with an honest verier ie a verier
who follows protocol P as desired can be simulated Additionally we require
that the simulator outputs accepting conversations where the challenge can
be chosen in advance ie the simulator can take any value c as input and
will output an accepting conversation where the challenge is equal to c A
protocol P satisfying these conditions will be called special honest verier
zeroknowledge
More precisely let xw  R and let a prover P and a verier V with
common input x be given The prover has w as private input Then Pxw
denotes the probability distribution on Accx induced by conversations be
tween P and V  provided that they both follow protocol P honestly We
require the following
Denition  Let xw  R Suppose we are given a probabilistic polyno
mial time algorithm S with the following properties
	 On input x and any c  CP  S outputs an accepting conversation from
Accx

 The distribution of Sx c where c is chosen uniformly at random from
CP is equal to Pxw

Then P is called special honest verier zero knowledge and S its special
simulator
In the following we will demonstrate that a protocol P that is special
honest verier zeroknowledge is in fact secure against a slightly more general
verier It follows immediately from Denition  that for each xed c 
CP Sx c outputs conversations a c r  Accx with exactly the same
distribution as a  Paxw c r  Prxw a auxa c ie according
to the honest prover who has access to xw Therefore it is sucient
that challenges c are independently chosen from the rst message in any
given execution of P in order for the conversations to be simulatible In
other words c may depend on anything including the history of executions
x etc but the provers rst message a in the given execution and the
conversation is still simulatible This proves the following theorem
Theorem  If eV is any probabilistic polynomial time verier who in any
given execution of protocol P chooses the challenge c independently from the
provers rst message a then the conversation between prover P and verier
V can be simulated by means of the special simulator S
Summarizing we require the following of our protocol P in order for it
to support our construction of noninteractive secure signature schemes
Denition  Suppose P satises the following conditions
	 CP  AP

 P is collisionintractible over G
 P is special honest verier zeroknowledge
Then P is called a signature protocol If P satises the second condition and
is honest verier zeroknowledge so it does not necessarily have a special
simulator P is called a quasi signature protocol
We now demonstrate that any given signature protocol P can be trans
formed into a new signature protocol P where the challenge length CP can
be of any size polynomial in the security parameter k

Theorem  Suppose there exists a signature protocol P for relation R and
generator G then there is a signature protocol P for R and G satisfying
that CP  t for any t polynomial in the security parameter k
Proof Without loss of generality we may assume that AP     CP The
protocol P goes as follows
  The prover sends a rst message a to the verier where a is computed
as in P
 The verier sends t random bits b     bt
 The prover sends t conversations in P ai ci ri i        t where
ci  bijjai for i        t   and ct  btjjjj    jj
 The verier checks that a  a that all conversations are accepting
conversations and that ci  bijjai for i        t    and that
ct  btjjjj    jj
By construction the challenge length t for P can be chosen what we
want it to be provided t  polyk Suppose now that we are given two
accepting conversations in P for some public string x with the same rst
message a but with dierent challenges b     bt and b

     b

t Let




j be the respective replies in those
conversations in P and let i be an index such that bi  bi Clearly this
implies that ci  ci Take i to be the smallest index such that ci  c

i
If i    we have a collision in P with respect to x as by denition of
P we must have a  a  aOn the other hand if i    ci must




i But then ai  a

i and we have




i in P with respect to x Therefore P
 is
collisionintractible over R and G
As for special honest verier zeroknowledge of P we now exhibit a special
simulator S for P that runs S as a subroutine S starts by receiving
a public string x and a challenge b     bt as input It proceeds by
putting ct  btjjjj    jj and feeding x and ct to S After S has output
an accepting conversation at ct rt in P with respect to x S repeats the
following for i  t       Put ci  bijjai feed x and ci to S and receive
an accepting conversation ai ci ri from S By invoking Theorem   it is
clear that S generates accepting conversations in P with respect to x

with exactly the same distribution as the conversations with the honest
verier in P  
Thus in the constructions to follow whenever we have a signature pro
tocol we may assume that the challenge length is whatever we need it to
be
Before investigating under which general assumptions signature protocols
can be shown to exist we mention some examples of proofs of knowledge that




 both the factoring and the RSAversions
  FiatShamir 
 if the number of secret roots is chosen suciently large
Schnorrs discrete log protocol  
 does not directly satisfy the condi
tions but can be modied to do so since it is based on a oneway group
homomorphism see below
 Sucient Assumptions
The most general computational assumptions we have been able to nd
sucient for existence of signature protocols is the existence of oneway
group homomorphisms and the existence of clawfree pairs of trapdoor one
way permutations No implication is known in either direction between these
two assumptions
OneWay Group Homomorphisms
Denition  A family of oneway group homomorphisms is a family of
group homomorphisms F  ff  G  Hg In the following we let kf 
log jHj ie the number of bits needed to represent an element in H We
will sometimes drop subscript f  if it is clear which f we refer to The family
has to satisfy the following properties
	 There is a polynomial time algorithm which given f and w  G com
putes fw in time polynomial in k


 There is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which on input  k
outputs an element f  G  H chosen uniformly from F  subject to
k  kf 
 The elements f  G  H  F satisfy that there is a probabilistic
algorithm which given G outputs an element chosen uniformly from G
in time polynomial in k
 The oneway property Let A be any probabilistic polynomial time al
gorithm which receives input f and fw where fw are chosen as
in points 
 and  Then the probability that A outputs y such that
fy  fw is superpolynomially small in k
 The elements f  G  H  F satisfy that group operation and inver
sion in G and H can be computed in time polynomial in k
An example of such a family could be the case where the homomorphisms
are discrete exponentiation modulo a prime ie each element f  G  H is
described by a kbit prime p and an element g  Zp G is the additive group
modulo p  H is the multiplicative group modulo p and fw  gw mod p
Given a family as in this denition we can make a binary relation and a
generator for it
Denition  Let F be as in Denition  Then RF is the binary rela
tion consisting of pairs f x     xkf w     wkf where f  F and
fwi  xi GF is the generator that on input  k generates f using prop
erty 
 of Denition  generates w     wkf using property  and nally
computes xi  fwi
Theorem  Suppose F is a family of oneway group homomorphisms Then
there exists a signature protocol for RF and GF 
Proof The protocol claimed takes f x     xk as common input while
w     wk are private input to the prover The protocol is now a straight
forward generalization of FeigeFiatShamir 
 and goes as follows
  The prover chooses a random r  G and sends fr to the verier
 The verier chooses bits e     ek at random and sends them to
the prover
	
 The prover returns z  r  we    w
ek 
k  The verier checks that
fz  fr  xe     x
ek 
k
This protocol is clearly complete with probability   Honest verier zero
knowledge is clear by standard arguments rst choose z and e     ek
at random then use this to compute an frvalue It is also clear that the
challenge is one bit longer than the rst message from the prover Thus
only the collision intractable property remains to be argued
So assume by contradiction that some enemy A can produce z z and
e     ek  e     e

k such that fz  fr  x
e 
    x
ek 
k and
fz  fr  x
e
 
   x
e
k 
k  This means that
fz  z  xd    x
dk 
k 
where all di are     or  and at least one of them is nonzero
We can then build the following algorithm which will invert f with the help
of A given a random f image x generate an output seemingly coming
from GF as follows choose w     wk and    j  k    at random
Put xi  fwi for i  j and xj  fwj  x Now run As algorithm
with f and the xis as input Clearly the set of xi is distributed exactly as
output from GF  whence As success probability is the same as in real life
Note that if A has success we can write xdj as




Now note that the set of xis contains no information about j whence
the probability that dj   given that A has success is at least equal to
 k     
Remark  It is clear that the protocol constructed in the proof above can
be modied to have any challenge length desired by having more xivalues
Enlarging the challenge length in this way will be more ecient than using
Theorem 

Examples of possible oneway group homomorphisms are the RSA func
tions squaring modulo a composite number or discrete exponentiation mod
ulo a prime or on an elliptic curve
 
It would be natural to try to generalize the result to any random self
reducible problem It is known that a random selfreducible problem has
a protocol that is in our terminology a quasisignature protocol  
 It
is not clear however how to get longer challenges based only on the self
reducible property But if in addition we assume we have a family of colli
sion intractable hash functions we can use the compression properties of the
hash functions to build a signature protocol Briey a family of collision
intractable hash functions H is a family of easily computable compression
functions such that it is easy to select a random function with output length
k but computationally infeasible to nd collisions for such a function with
probability nonnegligible in k
Since however quasisignature protocols are not assumed to be special
honest verier zeroknowledge only honest verier zeroknowledge we need
the following technical lemma before going any further
Lemma  Let P be honest verier zeroknowledge and collisionintractable
over R and G Then P can be compiled into a protocol P for relation R
and generator G that is also collisionintractable over R and G but that
additionally satises special honest verier zeroknowledge
Proof The claimed protocol works as follows The prover has access to
xw  R while the verier has access to x Let k be a security parameter
let l  polyk and let f  gt be the set of admissible challenges in P
  The prover computes l rst messages a     al as in P and sends
them to the verier
 The verier chooses l random bits b     bl and sends them to the
prover
 The prover chooses l random t   bitstrings      l and puts
c  jjb     cl  jjbl and computes the responses r     rl
according to P taking the challenges to be c     cl These values
are sent to the verier who checks whether c
t
  b     c
t
l  bl
and whether a c r     al cl rl are accepting conversations in
P with respect to x
First we show that collisionintractibility is preserved under this compi
lation Suppose we are given two accepting conversations in P with the
  
same rst message a     al but with dierent challenges b     bl
and b     b

l Let the respective replies be      l r     rl and




     r

l and let i be an index such that bi  b

i Then clearly




i are two accepting conversations in P for the
same public string x with ijjbi  ijjb

i We conclude that P
 is collision
intractable over R and G
The special simulator S for P runs Ps simulator S as a subroutine and
is dened as follows Run S l times At the end there are certainly
l conversations that have challenges with the same least signicant bit
 or   By the properties of S these events are equally likely to
occur If we repeat this procedure polyk times the probability that




 So with overwhelming probability two blocks of l conversations
are output one of which has  as the least signicant bit for all its l
conversations while the other has   Therefore if S receives a challenge
b     bl  f  gl as input together with the public string x it can
output an accepting conversation in P with b     bl as the challenge
in polynomial time with overwhelming probability by just selecting for
each bi a conversation from the corresponding block Furthermore it is
clear that the honest verier in P receives l conversations from P where
each of these conversations is according to conversations with an honest
verier in P By construction it is clear that S does the same using
simulator S to select honest verier conversations in P according to the
least signicant bit in the challenge while the selection is according to
uniform bits  
Theorem  Suppose there exists a quasi signature protocol P for relation R
and generator G and that a family H of collision intractable hash functions
exists Then there exists a signature protocol P for RH and GH Here RH
consists of pairs x h w where xw  R w is of length k bits and h  H
has output length k The generator GH runs G to generate xw and then
selects h  H with the desired output length
Proof First note that by Lemma   we may assume that P is special honest
verier zeroknowledge Then observe that a repetition of P in parallel is
trivially a quasi signature protocol Moreover from any quasi signature
protocol we can always construct a new one with any smaller challenge
 
length by letting the prover choose part of the challenge Hence we may
without loss of generality assume that CP  k    Let t  AP    Then
protocol P goes as follows
  The prover sends a rst message a to the verier computed as in P
 The verier sends t random bits b     bt
 The prover sends t conversations in P ai ci ri i        t
 The verier checks that a  a that all conversations are accepting
conversations and that ci  bijjhai for i        t   and that
ct  btjjjj    jj
It is easy to verify that this protocol has all the required properties see the
proof of Theorem  In particular collision intractability can be proved
observing that a collision for P would imply either a collision for P or for
h  
We have chosen to use in the above theorem a whole family of hash func
tions in stead of a single xed function because this ts into our theoretical
model In practice many hash functions do not come from a family but have
a xed description such as MD or SHS Our construction will also work
with one xed hash function and the argument that a successful enemy
would have to break either the hash function or the quasi signature protocol
would be the same as before
ClawFree Pairs of Trapdoor OneWay Permutations
In 	
 a secure signature scheme is exhibited based on a family of claw
free pairs of trapdoor oneway permutations Informally a pair of distinct
permutations f f is called clawfree if it is hard to compute x and y
such that fx  fy Knowledge of the trapdoor information however
enables ecient inversion of the permutations and computation of claws In
	
 an example of such a family is given whose clawfreeness is equivalent
to the diculty of factoring Blumintegers
In the following we will show that the existence of a family of clawfree
pairs of trapdoor oneway permutations is a sucient condition for the exis















Figure  Signature Protocol P based on f f
clawfree pair of trapdoor permutations as described below and then apply
ing our general construction to this signature protocol results in essentially
the same signature scheme as the original GMR sheme Hence our results
can be viewed as a generalization of 	

Let f f be a pair of functions from a family F of clawfree pairs of
trapdoor oneway permutations as output by a generator GF on input  k
and let s denote the trapdoor information The corresponding binary relation
RF consists of all such pairs f f s
Furthermore let t be a nonconstant polynomial in k For each c 
f  gt with c  cjjcjj    jjct fc	 denotes the function fc  	 fc  	    	 fct
which is also a permutation Using the trapdoor information for f f
such a function fc	 can eciently be inverted Note also that any pair of
permutations fc	 fc	 with c c
  f  gt and c  c is clawfree Let V
denote the set that is permuted by f and f The protocol P depicted in
Fig  is based on f f and it is assumed that the prover P has access to
the trapdoor information s
This protocol satises the conditions of a signature protocol by standard
arguments We thus have the following theorem
Theorem  Suppose F is a family of clawfree pairs of trapdoor oneway
permutations Then there exists a signature protocol for RF and GF 
 
 Main Result
We will now present the new signature scheme P  based on a signature
protocol P In Section  the following theorem will be proven
Theorem 	 Let P be a signature protocol for relation R and generator G
Then the signature scheme P is not existentially forgeable under adaptively
chosen message attacks
It is assumed that we are given a signature protocol P for relation R and
generator G By Theorem  we may assume that for each security parameter
k and for each instance xw as output by running G k the nonconstant
polynomial tk satises t  CP 
   AP The construction of P from P
works as follows
Initialization Phase
Given a security parameter k the signer uses the generator G to gen
erate two solved instances x and x with respective witnesses w and
w He also computes a auxa

  Pax w and puts x x a


in his public directory
Signing Phase
Let m  f  gt be the message to be signed and let i 
   The ith




  Pax w





 a i  auxa
 i




   Pax w
























be an authentication path for ai ie Autha
i









 with    j  i such that a
j
 is an ancestor of
ai We assume that the tuples in Autha
i
 are ordered in decreas






The receiver puts m  Authajr  r
jr
  where r is the number










  is the lth tuple in




 a the receiver has to

























     If all verications hold
the signature is accepted
Note that by assumption on the challenge length tk APxAPx  t





strings can be padded up to t bits if necessary using standard techniques
As we have also assumed that all occurring values have xed length de
scriptions depending only on the corresponding public string parsing these
concatenations is easy
 Proof of Security
Our notion of security for signature schemes is that of 	
 In this section we
show that no polynomially bounded adversary can construct a forgery on a
message that hasnt been signed by the real signer even if he is allowed to get
polynomially many signatures on messages that he has chosen in an adaptive
fashion We rst briey outline the proof of Theorem  It will be shown
that the existence of such a successful forger contradicts the assumption that
the protocol P is collision intractable over the generator G To this end we
compile this successful forger into an attacker that breaks that assumption
Before proceeding with the proof we will briey outline our approach
Let k be a given security parameter A keyobservation is that for any xed
polynomial number say P k of signatures the signature scheme P can be
simulated perfectly and eciently if one of the two witnesses w and w is
discarded right after generation
Bearing this in mind we will build a cracking algorithm A which gets a
problem instance x as generated by G as input and generates a collision
 
for this instance using the forgery algorithm A as a subroutine To do this
A builds an instance of P from x and a pair x w generated by running
G The public key will be the pair x x randomly permuted By the
perfectness of this simulation of P  we can runA and handle all its signature
requests and expect the same probability of success as in real life The
proof is then nalized by observing that a successsful forgery leads to a
collision for the instance x with probability  
In the following theorem it is assumed that we are given a signature
protocol P for generator G and relation R By Theorem  we may assume
that for each security parameter k and for each instance xw as output by
running G k the nonconstant polynomial tk satisies t  CP 
  AP
Theorem 
 Any probabilistic polynomial time cracking algorithm A that
forges a signature on a new message with probability 	k after at most poly
nomially many calls to a signer can be compiled into probabilistic polynomial
time procedure A that breaks the collision intractability of P over G with
probability of the order of 	k The running time of A is of the same order
as the running time of A
Proof Let a security parameter k be given and let x be an instance of P
generated by G on input  k
We now describe how A cracks the collision intractability of P by using
the forger A and the following simulation of P  A receives x as input
A rst runs G on input  k in order to obtain a solved instance x w
Then a bit b is chosen at random Put xb wb  x w and xb  x
For the simulation we distinguish between two cases
Case b   We create an authentication tree with P k internal nodes
starting at the leaves The leaves aj are generated as follows
  cj  f  gt
 aj c
j rj  Sx c
j
For children a i and a
 i
  generate a
i
  Pax w Then the parent a
i


















The resulting instance x x a of P is sent to the forger A After this
the cracking algorithm can start making its at most P k calls
The above takes care of Authai for i        P k Note that this
simulation can now deal with any signature request as the ith signa
ture request on a message mi can be completed by computing ri 




Case b   
  Generate a auxa

  Pax w and send the instance x x a


to the forger A
 Let mi  f  gt be the ith message to be signed Generate ai 
Sxmi Proceed as in Step  of the signing phase of P 
Note that in both cases the simulation can deal with any signature request
by the properties of the special simulator S Furthermore the distribution






 is always according to the honest signer who has
access to both w and w by Theorem   Thus the simulation is perfect
and we may now assume that the cracking algorithm outputs a forgery on
a new message ie a message that has not been signed by the simulator
m Without loss of generality we assume that this happens after exactly
P k calls with probability 	k
Let Autha r be the forgery on a new message m Suppose that
a  a
j
 for some    j  P k with probability 	k As m has not been
signed by the simulation we must have m  mj so A can get a collision




If on the contrary a  a
j
 for all    j  P k then there clearly








 in Autha and a node a
i
 in the tree with
a  a
i
 such that a
i
 is a leaf or a
i












In case ai is an internal node say with probability 	 k we immediately
get a collision If ai is a leaf with probability 	






i is   
 t
 as the distribution of ai is independent
of the distribution of cj by the properties of the special simulator and cj
was chosen uniformly at random Thus in this case we get a collision with
probability    t   From the perfectness of the simulation it follows that
 
the distribution of everything sent to A is independent of b Therefore the






















which is clearly of the same order as 	k Thus we have shown that any
forger of the signature scheme P can be turned very eciently into a
cracker of the collision intractibility of P with essentially the same prob
ability of success
 
Remark  Consider the following potentially stronger notion of security
for signature schemes Instead of requiring forgery on a new message to be
infeasible one could more generally demand that forging a new signature
is infeasible Obviously this implies that a forger cannot produce a signature
on a message that has never really been signed Additionally however it is
now infeasible to forge a new signature on a message that has previously been
signed We believe that from a theoretical viewpoint this is the proper and
most general notion of security for signature schemes Taking minor changes
into account our proof can easily be accomodated to this potentially slightly
stronger notion
 Concrete Examples
We now describe a signature scheme whose security is equivalent to the di
culty of computing discrete logarithms by applying our main construction to
a suitable transformation of the discrete log based protocol of Schnorr  

In its basic form this is a protocol for proving knowledge of a discrete log in
a group G of prime order q Such a group can be realized for example as a
subgroup of Z p where p is a prime and q divides p   
Let g    and let x  gw be the common input P is given w as private
input The protocol is a proof of knowledge for the relation that consists of
pairs  x gG w such that x  gw in G Let k denote the number of bits
needed to represent an element of G and let l  blog  qc Then the protocol
works as follows
  The prover chooses z at random in      q and sends a  gz to V 
 	
 The verier chooses c at random in      q and sends it to P 
 P sends r  z  cw mod q to V  and V checks that gr  axc
Completeness trivially holds with probability   Correct answers to two
dierent cvalues give two equations r  z  wc mod q and r   z 
wc  mod q so we nd that w  rr cc  mod q Therefore assuming
we generate inputs for the protocol by choosing w at random in G we have
collision intractability provided that it is infeasible to nd w from gw for
random w
Finally note that by choosing c and r at random we can make a simulated
conversation grxc c r between the honest verier and prover Since c can
be chosen freely we get special honest verier zeroknowledge
Thus this protocol is a quasisignature protocol With some modica
tions it can be turned into a signature protocol we will have as input to
the protocol d instances instead of   x w     xd wd where xi  gwi
Then the new protocol P goes as follows
  The prover chooses z at random in      l and sends a  gz to V 
 The verier chooses c     cd at random in      
l and sends them
to P 
 P sends r  z  cw      cdwd mod q to V  and V checks that
gr  a  xc    x
cd
d 
Completeness and special honest verier zeroknowledge are clear by the
same arguments as above Collision intractability can be shown by essentially
the same proof as for Theorem  Finally it is clear that by choosing d large
enough we can get a large enough challenge length and therefore a signature
protocol
We can now carry out our construction of the signature scheme P see
also Section  To set up an instance of P the signer generates two
independent instances of P xw  x w     xd wd and xw 
x w     xd wd with xi  gwi and xi  gwi for i        d The wi
and wi are chosen at random from Z q Note that both these instances use
the same pair gG The root of the authentication tree a is computed as
a  g
z 
   where z is chosen at random from Z q The initialization phase of

P is completed when the public key of the signer x x a is placed in the
public directory
We will now show how the signer computes the rst signature on a mes
sage m  f  gdl where m  mjj    jjmd and the mi are lbitstrings to be
interpreted as members of     l
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i are lbitstrings to be interpreted as members
of      l
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Note that the values a  and a


 are ready to play the role of a

 in the










 respectively Additionally however an authentication path has to be
given in any execution after the rst one to trace an authenticating node
ai back to a

 An authentication path for a node a
i









 such that a
j
 is an ancestor of a
i
 For example an au


















and the receiver will have to perform the necessary verications
We get signatures of length Ok bits where k is the number of bits
needed to represent an element in G Moreover one authentication step
requires a constant number of exponentiations in G both for signing and
verication Note that the   exponentiation needed from the signer uses
input independent from the bits authenticated c     cd Therefore we can
use the idea suggested by Schnorr of having the signer can precompute this
exponentiation if some idle time is available on his computer This way the
online time to generate a signature becomes almost negligible
Previously the only known way to get a signature scheme provably secure
based on discrete log was to use the method from 
 to build a collision
intractable hash function and then use Merkles construction This would
require an exponentiation for each bit processed in the hashing and moreover
 
we would need as a part of the signature a full preimage under the hash
function to authenticate   bit Therefore we would get signatures of length
Ok  bits and would need Ok  exponentiations to make a signature
 Conclusion
We have shown that the existence of signature protocols is a sucient condi
tion for the existence of signature schemes that are not existentially forgeable
under adaptively chosen message attacks which is the strongest notion of se
curity for signature schemes see 	
 The length of the signatures in our
schemes grows logarithmically in the number of signatures In addition to
the existence of clawfree pairs of trapdoor oneway permutations on which
the scheme from 	
 is based the most general computational assumption we
have been able to nd sucient for the existence of signature protocols is
the existence of oneway group homomorphisms As an example we have
presented a signature scheme whose security is equivalent to the diculty of
computing discrete logarithms
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